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What Are the Market and Regulatory Conditions under which Livestock
Mandatory Reporting would Benefit Livestock Producers?
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 9/22/06
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$86.44
135.24
118.58
140.34
68.07
51.45
71.07
95.37
243.13
$81.66
135.35
121.09
147.32
73.15
50.10
76.74
91.25
222.81
$88.14
132.94
119.94
142.09
62.75
52.84
69.82
98.00
240.29
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
* 
       
1.49
5.04
2.39
1.75
4.14
2.01
4.99
2.95
2.03
4.31
2.20
4.98
3.54
2.21
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
117.50
37.50
52.50
135.00
87.50
82.50
135.00
87.50
82.50
* No market.
On Wednesday, September 20, 2006, Senator
Chuck Hagel’s office announced the re-authorization
of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. Enacted in
2001, the Act provides market participants with
information on all cash and non-cash transactions
reported by packers to the Marketing Service on a daily
basis. The information is aggregated under specific
confidentiality guidelines to preserve anonymity of the
source, and published in the Mandatory Livestock and
Meat Market News Reports.
The Act was passed in 1999 with a sunset clause
requiring Congress to re-authorize it after five years. In
the Fall of 2004, Congress authorized a one-year
extension ending in October 1, 2005. Until last week,
producers have been voluntarily reporting to USDA
and separate legislation introduced by the House and
the Senate aimed at extending the Act beyond October
1, 2005, was being held up in committee.
There are two reasons why  re-authorization of the
Act could benefit Nebraska. First, if the Act were not
re-authorized, the Nebraska Department of Agriculture
would have to assume the burden of developing its
price reporting system by October 1, 2007, as required
by Nebraska Law. Second, published research
conducted by faculty in the Department of Agricultural
Economics at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln
shows that, under certain market and regulatory
conditions, Livestock Mandatory Reporting can be
beneficial to producers even if enhanced price
transparency (due to the Act) ends up facilitating tacit
collusion among packers. The market conditions under
which the Act can be beneficial are explained in a
forthcoming article co-authored by three professors
and a graduate student from the Department of
Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska–
Lincoln.1
A key result of this article is that there are two
main effects of enhanced price transparency, and these
two effects go in opposite directions. The first effect,
called the risk effect, has to do with transparency
making it possible for packers to make more accurate
predictions about cattle prices. The more accurate
these predictions, the lower the market risk, the less
variable are the packer profits, the greater is the
demand for cattle and the higher is the price received
by cattle feeders. The second effect has to do with
transparency potentially facilitating tacit collusion
because, by being able to better predict prices, packers
can also make better predictions about the way other
packers price cattle and consequently lower the price
received by cattle feeders relative to its competitive
level.   
In this context, a key issue is what USDA can do
to ensure that the risk effect dominates the collusive
effect of the Act so that cattle feeders benefit from the
increased transparency provided by the Act.
According to the authors:
“…the government could make headway
against collusion if the information collected
by Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
could be used to monitor packer competitive
behavior in livestock markets. However, the
authority to monitor competitive behavior in
livestock markets lies, not with AMS, but with
the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration (GIPSA) that is responsible
for the enforcement of the Packers and
Stockyards Act.    
While in theory, the two government agencies
could coordinate their efforts to ensure the
‘judicious’ use of information (and the
dominance of the risk effect of increased
transparency), coordination between AMS and
GIPSA is limited because of the legal
framework within which the two agencies
operate (GAO, 2005).  According to GIPSA2
officials, ‘individual packer data held by AMS
would be useful for monitoring competitive
behavior in livestock markets. However,
because GIPSA could not obtain that
confidential information unless the Attorney
General or the Secretary directed disclosure of
the information for enforcement purposes,
GIPSA is making do with the publicly
available AMS livestock market report data.
This monitoring effort is limited because AMS
reports do not include the company-specific
transaction data that might reveal anti-
competitive behavior’ (see page 20 of the GAO
report). 
In this context, for the government to ensure
that the risk effect dominates the collusive
effect of increased information, it should either
adjust the regulatory framework to facilitate
GIPSA’s access to AMS information on
packers’ conduct, delegate the monitoring of
packers’ conduct to AMS, or merge the two
agencies. Under the current regulatory
framework, AMS can only affect the
quantitative effects of the Act through the
amount of information contained in the
Reports.”  
Kenneth Njoroge, E. Yiannaka, K. Giannakas and A. Azzam.      
1
“Market and Welfare Effects of the U.S. Livestock
Mandatory Reporting Act.” Southern Economic Journal
(forthcoming).
 Government Accountability Office. “Livestock Market2
Reporting: USDA has Taken Some Steps to Ensure Quality,
but Additional Efforts Are Needed.” Report to Congressional
Requestors, GAO-06-202, December 2005.
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